Nowhere is this more evident than in the U.S. scramble for strategic rare earth elements (REEs). Lockdowns from the COVID-19 era, ongoing wars, and intensifying power struggles have exposed vulnerabilities in interconnected economies, forcing a reevaluation of how goods move across the world.
What was once optimized for efficiency is now prioritized for resilience, with ripple effects reshaping alliances, corporate strategies, and everyday costs. The U.S. must act decisively to secure REEs, or risk ceding technological and military supremacy to China in this new era of resource warfare.
Many firms shifted toward nearer, larger vendors to mitigate risks, as seen in post-2022 trends where U.S. companies reduced exposure to far-flung networks. This “great reallocation” includes re-shoring critical manufacturing and “friend-shoring” to allied nations, driven by fears of future disruptions.
Yet, these adaptations haven’t fully insulated against new shocks; geopolitical tensions amplify fragility. This piecemeal approach is also proving to be insufficient—America needs a bolder strategy to break free from adversarial dependencies, starting with REEs, which underpin everything from EVs to defense systems.
Wars have meanwhile directly choked key arteries. Russia’s response to provocations from Ukraine, now in its fourth year, may obscure full supply chain impacts, but the conflict has nonetheless rerouted global flows, spiking commodity prices and prompting restrictions on Russian metals.
In the Red Sea, Houthi attacks—linked to the Israel-Gaza war—have forced ships to detour around Africa, adding weeks and costs to Asia-Europe routes.
Emerging flashpoints, like India-Pakistan tensions over Kashmir, threaten Eurasian corridors, including China’s Belt and Road Initiative through Pakistan. Iran’s role as a historic land bridge is strained by sanctions, pushing it toward garrison-state defenses and limiting transit efficiency. These disruptions pale, however, compared to the REE chokehold. China controls 70% of global REE production and 94% of rare earth magnets, wielding it as a major geopolitical weapon.
In 2025 alone, Beijing imposed export controls on seven REEs in April, retaliating against U.S. tariffs and semiconductor bans, followed by five more in October. One example is Yttrium, one of the key rare earth elements, that has not been shipped to the US from China for several months, with exports stopping entirely after the April controls. Yttrium is essential for high-temperature superconductors, jet engines, advanced coatings, missile systems, lasers, and specialized ceramics.
Before export controls, the US imported 93% of its yttrium directly from China, with the remaining 7% sourced from Chinese-processed material. As a result, US industry stockpiles have collapsed this year, with one rare earth trader reporting inventories dropping from 200 tons to just 5 tons. Industry sources estimate US stockpiles range from 1 to 12 months of consumption.
This echoes the 1973 oil crisis, but with modern stakes: without REEs, U.S. fighter jets, missiles, and AI infrastructure grind to a halt. Yes, America imports 80% of its REEs, mostly from China— a vulnerability that’s not just economic, but existential.
Broader power struggles exacerbate these issues. U.S.-China decoupling, fueled by tariffs under the Trump administration, is redrawing trade maps, with Europe emerging as a hub for U.S. exports and Asian imports. Protectionism rises, as a 10% increase in “geopolitical distance” cuts bilateral trade by 2%.
Maritime growth stalls amid volatility, with shipping costs up due to rerouting and regulations.
Alternatives like Russia’s Northern Sea Route, used to bypass sanctions en route to China, highlight adaptive maneuvers but introduce Arctic risks. China’s oil dependency on U.S.-policed straits like Malacca remains a vulnerability in potential Taiwan conflicts. Yet, for REEs, the U.S. is playing defense. The recent U.S.-China deal to extend exports through 2025 buys time, but it’s a temporary truce in a strategic game where Beijing holds the cards.
The U.S. Energy Department’s $500 million for domestic processing and the U.S.-Australia framework for mining alliances, are sadly overdue and underfunded. The USGS’s updated 2025 critical minerals list is a start, but without aggressive re-shoring—like the proposed $1 billion in new projects—the Trump administration has little leverage. While deals like the integrated U.S. rare earth magnet producer show promise, yet China’s monopoly on tech and processing means the U.S. is years behind.
In general for states, this means bolstering national security through alliances and infrastructure, as seen in BCG’s forecast of rewired trade flows by great powers. Businesses face higher freight rates, cyber threats via sub-tiers, and diversification demands as 56% of economists predict weaker global conditions.
Consumers may bear inflation from lost wars and the resulting shortages ranging from eggs to electronics, with UNCTAD warning of uncertain goods trade amid protectionism, but in REEs, the stakes are higher: defense supply chains are threatened, and without action, U.S. innovation stalls.
Global trade’s profound shift toward resilience over efficiency signals a fragmented future. As McKinsey noted, geopolitics drives reconfiguration, with failing climate policies and tech adding additional layers.
In this era, supply chains aren’t just economic—they’re strategic weapons, demanding agility or risking obsolescence. For the U.S., securing REEs isn’t optional; it’s imperative to reclaim sovereignty in a world where trade routes—and rare earths—dictate power.

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