Putin: Russia Has Invoked Article 4 of Mutual Defense Treaty With North Korea

At the BRICS summit in Kazan Cyrus Simmons of NBC asked Putin about the presence of North Korean troops in Russia suggested by satellite images released by Seoul.

Responding, Putin first uttered one single solitary sentence about the troop presence: “Photos are a serious thing. If there are photos, then they reflect something.” Then spent 240 words recapping the evolution of the Ukrainian conflict starting in 2014, and then came out with this bombshell:

“As for our relations with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: as you know, today, I think, our agreement on strategic partnership was ratified. There is Article 4. We do not doubt that the North Korean leadership takes our agreements seriously. What and how we will do within the framework of this article is our business. First, we need to conduct appropriate negotiations regarding the implementation of Article 4 of this agreement. We are in contact with our North Korean friends. We will see how this process develops.“

The typical media report on this exchange read “Putin does not deny presence of North Korean troops”. In other words, the reporting focused on the single line Putin uttered about the troop presence. But his non-denial, non-confirmation didn’t give us any new information. It’s filler. The actually newsworthy part came later.

The Article 4 of the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between Russia and North Korea reads:

“In case either of the signaturies is placed in a state of war by an armed attack by one or several states, the other shall provide military and other assistance with all means in its possession without delay in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter and the laws of the DPRK and the Russian Federation.”

In other words, behind the unassuming name lurks a fully-fledged mutual defense treaty.

Thus what happened in the exchange was: Asked about the presence of North Koreans, Putin, unprompted, instead opted to inform the reporter about the larger picture: Russia has a defensive alliance treaty with North Korea which has now been triggered.

Consider the significance of this. First just the historical significance. Since 1945 bilateral military alliances have been rare, and it’s rare for any kind of mutual defense treaty to trigger.

Secondly, this clarifies that Article 4 of the DPRK-Russian treaty will be activated by the current war. Concluding a mutual defense treaty with a nation already at war is a rare thing and a delicate affair. Surely the two governments already agreed whether the treaty would be activated by the current fighting — or if it was just for the next war — when they were still negotiating it, but it’s not something they ever told us. Now we know, that yes, Article 4 was crafted with the current war in mind.

Thirdly, there is a clue in there, in that when asked about possible North Korean soldiers in Russia, Putin didn’t pivot to talking about a “military exercise” with a neighbor like so many commentators have assured us this is. Rather his mind went to Article 4 and the mutual defense treaty with North Korea. If the Koreans are in Russia, that is the context they are there in, not some “exercise”.

Also, while the question of whether North Korean infantrymen will appear in Kursk or not is an interesting one, many are so stuck on it that they’re failing to take in the significance of what has already happened and what we have already been told:

1. There now exists a mutual defense treaty between Russia and North Korea (Duma voted in 397-0 last week).
2. The treaty has been activated obligating North Korea to render military aid.

These would be shocking things in 2021.

Also, it means that whether Korean soldiers appear on the frontline is somewhat beside the point. Whether they do or not, some additional form of military aid will be rendered. And whether they do or not, Russia will accrue a debt to North Korea, and an obligation to defend her in the future.

At this point, many things could be said about Russia and North Korea becoming each other’s best friends depending on the vantage point.

It could be said this represents a severe case of blowback for the Empire. Pyongyang getting a powerful backer and close ally is unwelcome for DC and karma for backing Moscow and Pyongyang both into a corner.

It could also be said that a Russian George Washington would probably recoil at this foreign entanglement. Being on the hook to defend one of the states the Imperial Capital would most like to crush is a headache for the Empire alright, but it’s not necessarily such a great position for yourself to be in either. It’s easy to see what makes the deal worth it for Putin — it’s the extreme desperation for more manpower. But the manpower shortage is artificially created by the refusal to mobilize. In this way, extending security guarantees to North Korea becomes yet another cost Russia pays for not mobilizing. (12,000 troops for a Russian security guarantee is an incredibly good deal for NK.)

Another thing that could be said is that this new alliance exposes the incredible foolishness and short-sightedness of Putin’s previous policy in going along with the US in imposing even more UN sanctions on North Korea just 7 short years ago.

Interestingly should North Korea actually enter the war with its infantry, it won’t be the first 3rd party to do so. In 2022 the unrecognized statelet of South Ossetia did just that, dispatching a unit to fight on the Russian side. In similar circumstances too where the Russians were desperately scrounging up manpower anywhere they could get it, except mobilization in Russia. (There was a Moscow-ordered total mobilization in Donetsk and Lugansk that went beyond even the Ukrainian one.)

However in the case of South Ossetia, the security partnership already existed, so might as well extract some utility for Russia out of it. (Also it was partly South Ossetian-driven because they’re trying to get themselves incorporated into Russia to unify with North Ossetia.) But in this case, Moscow extended a security guarantee that did not previously exist to get the aid.

As you may have guessed I am not among those who optimistically suggest that if North Korea has sent troops it is “to get combat experience”. I find that silly.

North Korea hasn’t intervened in a foreign war since 1973. That’s 50 years of non-interventionism. (South Korea was in Iraq and Afghanistan both.) Even just sending troops to touch foreign soil in Vladivostok is an incredible break with the past for Pyongyang. Such a monumental shift is not undertaken “to get experience”.

It should be understood that for North Korea helping Russia is not without cost and danger either. It paints an American target on her. Which is why the policy of non-interventionism was previously closely and religiously followed for fifty years — to avoid provoking the ire of the Empire on matters that are not key North Korean national interest. But provoking the Empire’s ire can be worth it if an Article 4 security guarantee from Russia (along with oil, fertilizer, tech transfers…) is won in return.

Interestingly the last time Russia ratified a mutual defense treaty was on February 22, 2022 with Donetsk and Lugansk. The significance of that one also escaped many commentators who would not learn of it until two days later on February 24.